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**ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 Information Security**

**Secretariat: DIN**

**Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection—  
Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 5: Pre-defined packages of  
security requirements**

**Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection de la vie privée — Critères  
d'évaluation pour la sécurité des technologies de l'information — *Partie 5 : Paquets  
prédéfinis d'exigences de sécurité***

## Contents

Page

Foreword.....	iv
Introduction .....	v
1 Scope.....	1
2 Normative references .....	1
3 Terms and Definitions .....	1
4 Evaluation Assurance Levels .....	2
4.1 Family Name.....	2
4.2 Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview .....	2
4.2.1 General.....	2
4.2.2 Relationship between assurances and assurance levels .....	2
4.3 Evaluation assurance level (EAL) objectives .....	4
4.4 Evaluation assurance level packages .....	5
4.4.1 General.....	5
4.4.2 Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested .....	5
4.4.3 Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested .....	7
4.4.4 Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked .....	8
4.4.5 Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested and reviewed.....	9
4.4.6 Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) – semiformally verified designed and tested.....	11
4.4.7 Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) – verified design and tested .....	13
4.4.8 Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested.....	14
5 Composed Assurance Packages.....	17
5.1 Family Name.....	17
5.2 Composed assurance package (CAP) overview.....	17
5.2.1 General.....	17
5.2.2 Relationship between assurances and assurance levels .....	17
5.3 Composed assurance package (CAP) objectives .....	18
5.4 Packages in the CAP family .....	20
5.4.1 Composition assurance level A (CAP-A) - Structurally composed .....	20
5.4.2 Composition assurance level B (CAP-B) - Methodically composed .....	21
5.4.3 Composition assurance level C (CAP-C) - Methodically composed, tested and reviewed.....	22
6 Composite Product Package (COMP) .....	24
6.1 Package name .....	24
6.2 Package type .....	24
6.3 Package overview.....	24
6.4 Objectives.....	24
6.5 Security assurance components.....	24
7 Protection Profile Assurance (PPA) .....	24
7.1 Family Name.....	24
7.2 PPA family overview .....	24
7.3 PPA family objectives.....	25
7.4 PPA Packages.....	25
7.4.1 Direct Rationale PP (PPA-DR) .....	25
7.4.2 Protection Profile Assurance Package - Standard (PPA-STD).....	26
8 Security Target Assurance (STA) .....	26
8.1 Family Name.....	26

<b>8.2</b>	<b>STA family overview.....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>8.3</b>	<b>STA family objectives .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>8.4</b>	<b>STA Packages .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>8.4.1</b>	<b>Direct Rationale ST (STA-DR) .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>8.4.2</b>	<b>Security Target Assurance Package - Standard (STA-STD) .....</b>	<b>28</b>

## Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see [www.iso.org/directives](http://www.iso.org/directives)).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see [www.iso.org/patents](http://www.iso.org/patents)).

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see [www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html](http://www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html).

This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology, Subcommittee SC 27, IT Security techniques.

A list of all parts in the ISO/IEC 15408 series can be found on the ISO website.

Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user's national standards body. A complete listing of these bodies can be found at [www.iso.org/members.html](http://www.iso.org/members.html).

This is the **first** edition of ISO/IEC 15408-5.

## Introduction

This document provides pre-defined packages of security requirements. Such security requirements may be useful for stakeholders as they strive for conformity between evaluations. Packages of security requirements may also help reduce the effort in developing PPs and STs.

ISO/IEC 15408-1 defines the term “package” and describes the fundamental concepts.

This document presents:

- *evaluation assurance level (EAL)* family of packages that specify pre-defined sets of security assurance components that may be referenced in PPs and STs and which specify appropriate security assurances to be provided during an evaluation of a TOE.
- *composition assurance (CAP)* family of packages that specify sets of security assurance components used for specifying appropriate security assurances to be provided during an evaluation of composed TOEs.
- *composite product (COMP)* package that specifies a set of security assurance components used for specifying appropriate security assurances to be provided during an evaluation of a composite product TOEs.
- *Protection Profile Assurance (PPA)* family of packages that specify sets of security assurance components used for specifying appropriate security assurances to be provided during a protection profile evaluation.
- *Security Target Assurance (STA)* family of packages that specify sets of security assurance components used for specifying appropriate security assurances to be provided during a Security Target evaluation.

The audience for this document includes consumers, developers, and evaluators of secure IT products.



# Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection— Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements

## 1 Scope

This document provides packages of security assurance and security functional requirements that have been identified as useful in support of common usage by stakeholders.

### EXAMPLE

Examples of provided packages include the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the composed assurance packages (CAPs).

## 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 15408-1, *Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection— Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1: Introduction and general requirements*

ISO/IEC 15408-3, *Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection— Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 3: Security assurance components*

## 3 Terms and Definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 15408-1 apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at <http://www.electropedia.org/>
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <http://www.iso.org/obp>

## 4 Evaluation Assurance Levels

### 4.1 Family Name

The name of this family of packages is *Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)*.

### 4.2 Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview

#### 4.2.1 General

The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The approach of ISO/IEC 15408-1 identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

**NOTE** Not all families and components given in ISO/IEC 15408-3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those Protection Profiles (PPs) and Security Targets (STs) for which they provide utility. Additionally, some classes found in ISO/IEC 15408-3 are not relevant for the EALs. Examples of such classes include the APE and ACO classes.

A set of assurance components have been chosen for each EAL.

A higher level of assurance than that provided by a given EAL can be achieved by:

- a) including additional assurance components from other assurance families; or
- b) replacing an assurance component with a higher-level assurance component from the same assurance family.

#### 4.2.2 Relationship between assurances and assurance levels

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the SARs found in ISO/IEC 15408-3 and the assurance levels defined in this document. While assurance components further decompose into assurance elements, assurance elements cannot be individually referenced by assurance levels.

**NOTE** The arrow in the figure represents a reference from an EAL to an assurance component within the class where it is defined.




Figure 1 — Assurance and assurance level association

Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

Those items marked in grey are not applicable in the EAL specification. However, they may be used to augment the EAL package.

NOTE Although the ALC\_FLR and ALC\_TDA families are not shown in Table 1, they are often used as an augmentation to the EALs.

**Table 1 — Evaluation assurance level summary**

Assurance class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7
Development	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2
	ADV_INT					2	3	3
	ADV_SPM						1	1
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6
Guidance documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3
ST evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5

### 4.3 Evaluation assurance level (EAL) objectives

As outlined in 4.4, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in this document for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in ISO/IEC 15408-3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all the assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

The notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in ISO/IEC 15408-1, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognized by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

NOTE An EAL cannot be augmented if it is included in an ST that claims exact conformance to a PP.

## 4.4 Evaluation assurance levels

### 4.4.1 General

Subclause 4.4 provides definitions of the EALs, highlighting differences between the specific requirements and the prose characterisations of those requirements using bold type.

### 4.4.2 Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested

#### 4.4.2.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested*.

#### 4.4.2.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

#### 4.4.2.3 Package overview

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 requires only a limited ST. It is sufficient to simply state the required SFRs for the TOE, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.

#### 4.4.2.4 Package objectives

**EAL1 provides a basic level of assurance by a limited ST and an analysis of the SFRs in that ST using a functional and interface specification and guidance documentation, to understand the security behaviour.**

**The analysis is supported by a search for potential vulnerabilities in the public domain and independent testing (functional and penetration) of the TSF.**

**EAL1 also provides assurance through unique identification of the TOE and of the relevant evaluation documents.**

This EAL provides a meaningful increase in assurance over unevaluated IT.

#### 4.4.2.5 Assurance components

Table 2 gives the assurance components included in EAL 1.

**Table 2 — EAL1**

<b>Assurance Class</b>	<b>Assurance components</b>
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey

#### 4.4.3 Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested

##### 4.4.3.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) –structurally tested*.

##### 4.4.3.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

##### 4.4.3.3 Package overview

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.

##### 4.4.3.4 Objectives

**EAL2** provides assurance by a **full** ST and an analysis of the SFRs in that ST, using a functional and interface specification, guidance documentation **and a basic description of the architecture of the TOE**, to understand the security behaviour.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, **evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, and a vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional specification, TOE design, security architecture description and guidance evidence provided) demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential.**

**EAL2** also provides assurance through **use of a configuration management system and evidence of secure delivery procedures.**

This EAL **represents** a meaningful increase in assurance **from EAL1 by requiring developer testing, a vulnerability analysis (in addition to the search of the public domain), and independent testing based upon more detailed TOE specifications.**

##### 4.4.3.5 Assurance components

Table 3 gives the assurance components included in EAL 2.

**Table 3 — EAL2**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system

Assurance Class	Assurance components
	ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis

#### 4.4.4 Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked

##### 4.4.4.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) –methodically tested and checked.*

##### 4.4.4.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

##### 4.4.4.3 Package overview

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.

##### 4.4.4.4 Objectives

**EAL3** provides assurance by a full ST and an analysis of the SFRs in that ST, using a functional and interface specification, guidance documentation, and an **architectural description** of the **design** of the TOE, to understand the security behaviour.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification **and TOE design**, selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, and a vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional specification, TOE design, security architecture description and guidance evidence provided) demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential.

**EAL3** also provides assurance through **the use of development environment controls**, TOE configuration management, and evidence of secure delivery procedures.

This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from **EAL2** by requiring **more complete testing coverage** of the **security** functionality and **mechanisms and/or procedures that provide some confidence that the TOE will not be tampered with during development.**

#### 4.4.4.5 Assurance components

Table 4 gives the assurance components included in EAL 3.

**Table 4 — EAL3**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
	ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
	ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis

#### 4.4.5 Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested and reviewed

##### 4.4.5.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) –methodically designed, tested and reviewed.*

##### 4.4.5.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

#### 4.4.5.3 Package overview

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, although rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.

#### 4.4.5.4 Objectives

**EAL4** provides assurance by a full ST and an analysis of the SFRs in that ST, using a functional and **complete** interface specification, guidance documentation, a description of the **basic modular** design of the TOE, **and a subset of the implementation**, to understand the security behaviour.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification and TOE design, selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, and a vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional specification, TOE design, **implementation representation**, security architecture description and guidance evidence provided) demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with **an Enhanced-Basic** attack potential.

**EAL4** also provides assurance through the use of development environment controls **and additional** TOE configuration management **including automation**, and evidence of secure delivery procedures.

This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from **EAL3** by requiring more **design description**, the **implementation representation for the entire TSF**, and **improved** mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered with during development.

#### 4.4.5.5 Assurance components

Table 5 gives the assurance components included in EAL 4.

**Table 5 — EAL4**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
	ADV_TDS.3 Modular design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
	ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model

Assurance Class	Assurance components
	ALC_TAT.1 Well defined developer tools
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis

#### 4.4.6 Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) – semiformally verified designed and tested

##### 4.4.6.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) – semiformally designed and tested.*

##### 4.4.6.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

##### 4.4.6.3 Package overview

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialized techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.

##### 4.4.6.4 Objectives

**EAL5** provides assurance by a full ST and an analysis of the SFRs in that ST, using a functional and complete interface specification, guidance documentation, a description of the design of the TOE, and the implementation, to understand the security behaviour. **A modular TSF design is also required.**

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification, TOE design, selective independent confirmation of the developer

test results, and **an independent** vulnerability analysis demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with **a moderate** attack potential.

**EAL5** also provides assurance through the use of **a** development environment controls, and **comprehensive** TOE configuration management including automation, and evidence of secure delivery procedures.

This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from **EAL4** by requiring **semiformal design descriptions, a more structured (and hence analysable) architecture**, and improved mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered with during development.

#### 4.4.6.5 Assurance components

Table 6 gives the assurance components included in EAL 5.

**Table 6 — EAL5**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
	ADV_TDS.4 Semi-formal modular design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
	ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis

#### 4.4.7 Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) – verified design and tested

##### 4.4.7.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) –semiformally verified design and tested.*

##### 4.4.7.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

##### 4.4.7.3 Package overview

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.

##### 4.4.7.4 Objectives

**EAL6** provides assurance by a full ST and an analysis of the SFRs in that ST, using a functional and complete interface specification, guidance documentation, the design of the TOE, and the implementation to understand the security behaviour. **Assurance is additionally gained through a formal model of select TOE security policies and a semiformal presentation of the functional specification and TOE design.** A modular, **layered and simple** TSF design is also required.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification, TOE design, selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, and an independent vulnerability analysis demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a **high** attack potential.

**EAL6** also provides assurance through the use of a **structured** development process, **development** environment controls, and comprehensive TOE configuration management including **complete** automation, and evidence of secure delivery procedures.

This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from **EAL5** by requiring **more comprehensive analysis**, a **structured representation of the implementation**, more **architectural structure (e.g. layering)**, **more comprehensive independent vulnerability analysis**, and improved **configuration management and development environment controls**.

##### 4.4.7.5 Assurance components

Table 7 gives the assurance components included in EAL 6.

**Table 7 — EAL6**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information
	ADV_IMP.2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF

Assurance Class	Assurance components
	ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security model policy
	ADV_TDS.5 Complete Semi-formal modular design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
	ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards – all parts
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
	ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

#### 4.4.8 Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested

##### 4.4.8.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) –formally verified design and tested.*

##### 4.4.8.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

##### 4.4.8.3 Package overview

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high-risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.

#### 4.4.8.4 Objectives

**EAL7** provides assurance by a full ST and an analysis of the SFRs in that ST, using a functional and complete interface specification, guidance documentation, the design of the TOE, and **a structured presentation** of the implementation to understand the security behaviour. Assurance is additionally gained through a formal model of select TOE security policies and a semiformal presentation of the functional specification and TOE design. A modular, layered and simple TSF design is also required.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification, TOE design **and implementation representation, complete** independent confirmation of the developer test results, and an independent vulnerability analysis demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a high attack potential.

**EAL7** also provides assurance through the use of a structured development process, development environment controls, and comprehensive TOE configuration management including complete automation, and evidence of secure delivery procedures.

This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from **EAL6** by requiring more comprehensive analysis **using formal representations and formal correspondence**, and **comprehensive testing**.

#### 4.4.8.5 Assurance components

Table 8 gives the assurance components included in EAL 7.

**Table 8 — EAL7**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification
	ADV_IMP.2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security model policy
	ADV_TDS.6 Complete Semi-formal modular design with formal high-level design presentation
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
	ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
	ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards – all parts
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction

Assurance Class	Assurance components
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
	ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
	ATE_IND.3 Independent testing - complete
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

## 5 Composed Assurance Packages

### 5.1 Family Name

The name of this family of packages is *Composed Assurance Packages (CAPs)*.

### 5.2 Composed assurance package (CAP) overview

#### 5.2.1 General

The structure of the CAPs is similar to that of the EALs. The main difference between these two types of package is the type of TOE they apply to; the EALs applying to component TOEs and the CAPs applying to composed TOEs.

Figure 2 illustrates the CAPs and associated structure defined in this document.

NOTE While the figure shows the contents of the assurance components, it is intended that this information would be included in a CAP by reference to the actual components defined in ISO/IEC 15408-3.

Some dependencies identify the activities performed during the evaluation of the dependent component on which the composed TOE activity relies. Where it is not explicitly identified that the dependency is on a dependent component activity, the dependency is to another evaluation activity of the composed TOE.

A higher level of assurance than that provided by a given CAP can be achieved by:


- a) including additional assurance components from other assurance families; or
- b) replacing an assurance component with a higher-level assurance component from the same assurance family.

The ACO: Composition components included in the CAP assurance packages should not be used as augmentations for component TOE evaluations, as this would provide no meaningful assurance for the component.

#### 5.2.2 Relationship between assurances and assurance packages

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the SARs and the composed assurance packages defined in this document. While assurance components further decompose into assurance elements, assurance elements cannot be individually referenced by assurance packages.

NOTE The arrow in the figure represents a reference from a CAP to an assurance component within the class where it is defined.



**Figure 2 — Assurance and composed assurance package association**

### 5.3 Composed assurance package (CAP) objectives

The Composed Assurance Packages (CAPs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance for composed TOEs.

**NOTE** There are only a small number of families and components from ISO/IEC 15408-3 included in the CAPs. This is due to their nature of building upon evaluation results of previously evaluated entities (base components and dependent components) and is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances.

CAPs are to be applied to composed TOEs, which are comprised of components that have been, or are going through, component TOE evaluation (see ISO/IEC 15408-3:20XX Annex B). The individual components will have been certified to an EAL or another assurance package specified in the ST. It is expected that a basic level of assurance in a composed TOE will be gained through application of EAL1, which can be achieved with information about the components that is generally available in the public domain. (EAL1 can be applied as specified within to both component and composed TOEs.) CAPs provide an alternative approach to obtaining higher levels of assurance for a composed TOE than application of the EALs above EAL1.

While a dependent component can be evaluated using a previously evaluated and certified base component to satisfy the IT platform requirements in the environment, this does not provide any

formal assurance of the interactions between the components or the possible introduction of vulnerabilities resulting from the composition. Composed assurance packages consider these interactions and, at higher levels of assurance, ensure that the interface between the components has itself been the subject of testing. A vulnerability analysis of the composed TOE is also performed to consider the possible introduction of vulnerabilities as a result of composing the components.

Table 9 represents a summary of the CAPs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of CAPs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the 5.4, three hierarchically ordered composed assurance packages are defined in this document for the rating of a composed TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each CAP represents more assurance than all lower CAPs. The increase in assurance from CAP to CAP is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements). These increases result in greater analysis of the composition to identify the impact on the evaluation results gained for the individual component TOEs.

These CAPs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Clause 6 of ISO/IEC 15408-3:20XX. More precisely, each CAP includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

The CAPs only consider resistance against an attacker with an attack potential up to Enhanced-Basic. This is due to the level of design information that can be provided through the ACO\_DEV, limiting some of the factors associated with attack potential (knowledge of the composed TOE) and subsequently affecting the rigour of vulnerability analysis that can be performed by the evaluator. Therefore, the level of assurance in the composed TOE is limited, although the assurance in the individual components within the composed TOE may be much higher.

Table 9 shows a summary of the composed assurance packages.

**Table 9 — Composition assurance package summary**

Assurance class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Composition Assurance Package		
		CAP-A	CAP-B	CAP-C
Composition	ACO_COR	1	1	1
	ACO_CTT	1	2	2
	ACO_DEV	1	2	3
	ACO_REL	1	1	2
	ACO_VUL	1	2	3
Guidance documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1
Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC	1	1	1
	ALC_CMS	2	2	2
ST evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1

	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2
	ASE_REQ	1	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1
	ASE_TSS	1	1	1

## 5.4 Packages in the CAP family

### 5.4.1 Composition assurance package A (CAP-A) - Structurally composed

#### 5.4.1.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Composition assurance package A (CAP-A) –Structurally composed*.

#### 5.4.1.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

#### 5.4.1.3 Package overview

CAP-A is applicable when a composed TOE is integrated and confidence in the correct security operation of the resulting composite is required. This requires the cooperation of the developer of the dependent component in terms of delivery of design information and test results from the dependent component certification, without requiring the involvement of the base component developer.

CAP-A is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record.

#### 5.4.1.4 Objectives

**CAP-A provides assurance by analysis of a ST for the composed TOE. The SFRs in the composed TOE ST are analysed using the outputs from the evaluations of the component TOEs (e.g. ST, guidance documentation) and a specification for the interfaces between the component TOEs in the composed TOE to understand the security behaviour.**

**The analysis is supported by independent testing of the interfaces of the base component that are relied upon by the dependent component, as described in the reliance information, evidence of developer testing based on the reliance information, development information and composition rationale, and selective independent confirmation of the developer test results. The analysis is also supported by a vulnerability review of the composed TOE by the evaluator.**

**CAP-A also provides assurance through unique identification of the composed TOE (i.e. IT TOE and guidance documentation).**

#### 5.4.1.5 Assurance components

Table 10 gives the assurance components included in CAP-A.

**Table 10 — CAP-A**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ACO: Composition	ACO_COR.1 Composition rationale
	ACO_CTT.1 Interface testing
	ACO_DEV.1 Functional description

Assurance Class	Assurance components
	ACO_REL.1 Basic reliance information
	ACO_VUL.1 Composition vulnerability review
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

## 5.4.2 Composition assurance package B (CAP-B) - Methodically composed

### 5.4.2.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Composition assurance package B (CAP-B) –Methodically composed.*

### 5.4.2.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

### 5.4.2.3 Package overview

CAP-B permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from understanding, at a subsystem level, the effects of interactions between component TOEs integrated in the composed TOE, whilst minimising the demand of involvement of the base component developer.

CAP-B is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the composed TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.

### 5.4.2.4 Objectives

**CAP-B** provides assurance by analysis of a **full** ST for the composed TOE. The SFRs in the composed TOE ST are analysed using the outputs from the evaluations of the component TOEs (e.g. ST, guidance documentation), a specification for the interfaces between the component TOEs **and the TOE design (describing TSF subsystems) contained** in the composed **development information** to understand the security behaviour.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the interfaces of the base component that are relied upon by the dependent component, as described in the reliance information (**now also including TOE design**), evidence of developer testing based on the reliance information, development information and composition rationale, and selective independent confirmation of the developer test results. The analysis is also supported by a vulnerability **analysis** of the composed TOE by the evaluator **demonstrating resistance to attackers with basic attack potential**.

This CAP represents a meaningful increase in assurance from CAP-A by requiring more complete testing coverage of the security functionality.

#### 5.4.2.5 Assurance components

Table 11 gives the assurance components included in CAP-B.

**Table 11 — CAP-B**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ACO: Composition	ACO_COR.1 Composition rationale
	ACO_CTT.2 Rigorous interface testing
	ACO_DEV.2 Basic evidence of design
	ACO_REL.1 Basic reliance information
	ACO_VUL.2 Composition vulnerability analysis
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
	ASE_REQ.2 Stated security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

#### 5.4.3 Composition assurance package C (CAP-C) - Methodically composed, tested and reviewed

##### 5.4.3.1 Package Name

The name of the package is: *Composition assurance package C (CAP-C) –Methodically composed, tested and reviewed.*

##### 5.4.3.2 Package Type

This is an assurance Package.

##### 5.4.3.3 Package overview

CAP-C permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive analysis of the interactions between the components of the composed TOE, which, although rigorous, do not require full access to all evaluation evidence of the base component.

CAP-C is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity composed TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.

#### 5.4.3.4 Objectives

**CAP-C** provides assurance by analysis of a full ST for the composed TOE. The SFRs in the composed TOE ST are analysed using the outputs from the evaluations of the component TOEs (e.g. ST, guidance documentation), a specification for the interfaces between the component TOEs and the TOE design (describing TSF **modules**) contained in the composed development information to understand the security behaviour.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the interfaces of the base component that are relied upon by the dependent component, as described in the reliance information (now including TOE design), evidence of developer testing based on the reliance information, development information and composition rationale, and selective independent confirmation of the developer test results. The analysis is also supported by a vulnerability analysis of the composed TOE by the evaluator demonstrating resistance to attackers with **Enhanced-Basic** attack potential.

This CAP represents a meaningful increase in assurance from **CAP-B** by requiring more **design description and demonstration of resistance to a higher attack potential**.

#### 5.4.3.5 Assurance components

Table 12 gives the assurance components included in CAP-C.

**Table 12 — CAP-C**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ACO: Composition	ACO_COR.1 Composition rationale
	ACO_CTT.2 Rigorous interface testing
	ACO_DEV.3 Detailed evidence of design
	ACO_REL.2 Reliance information
	ACO_VUL.3 Enhanced-Basic Composition vulnerability analysis
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ASE: ST evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
	ASE_REQ.2 Stated security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

## 6 Composite Product Package (COMP)

### 6.1 Package name

The name of the package is *Composite Product Package (COMP)*.

### 6.2 Package type

This package is an *assurance package*.

### 6.3 Package overview

COMP provides assurance that a composite product TOE has been assembled and evaluated according to the relevant criteria.

### 6.4 Objectives

Assurance components \*.COMP are applicable when composition techniques according to ISO/IEC 15408-1:20XX, Clause 13 are used. The objective is to ensure that the TOE has been composed considering the requirements given in ISO/IEC 15408-1 and ISO/IEC 15408-3 and that the evaluation of STs, life cycle requirements, design and vulnerability analysis for the composed TOE have been performed according to the criteria specified in ISO/IEC 15408-3. Providing assurance that potential contradictions and inconsistencies have been considered.

### 6.5 Security assurance components

The security assurance components given in Table 13 — COMP are included in the package.

**Table 13 — COMP**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ASE: ST Evaluation	ASE_COMP.1 Consistency of composite product ST
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_COMP.1 Integration of the application into the underlying platform and Consistency check for delivery and acceptance procedures
ADV: Development	ADV_COMP.1 Design compliance with the platform certification report, guidance and ETR_COMP
ATE: Tests	ATE_COMP.1 Composite product functional testing
AVA: Vulnerability analysis	AVA_COMP.1 Composite product vulnerability assessment

## 7 Protection Profile Assurances (PPA)

### 7.1 Family Name

The name of this family of packages is *Protection Profile Assurance Packages (PPA)*.

### 7.2 PPA family overview

The Protection Profile Assurance (PPA) family provides two assurance packages for PP evaluation.

- a) Assurance package for evaluating direct rationale PPs
- b) Assurance package for evaluating standard PPs

These assurance packages provide the components that are used in the evaluation of each type of Protection Profile described in ISO/IEC 15408-1.

Table 14 represents a summary of the PPAs. The columns represent the set of PPAs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

These PPAs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Clause 7 of ISO/IEC 15408-3:20XX. More precisely, each PPA includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

**Table 14 — PPA summary**

Assurance class	Assurance family	Assurance Components by Protection Profile Assurance Package	
		PPA-DR	PPA-STD
Protection Profile evaluation	APE_CCL	1	1
	APE_ECD	1	1
	APE_INT	1	1
	APE_OBJ	1	2
	APE_REQ	1	2
	APE_SPD	1	1

### 7.3 PPA family objectives

The PPA objectives are to support the provision of assurance through evaluation that a protection profile conforms with the requirements given in ISO/IEC 15408-1.

### 7.4 PPA Packages

#### 7.4.1 Protection Profile Assurance Package - Direct Rationale PP (PPA-DR)

##### 7.4.1.1 Package name

The name of the package is *Protection Profile Assurance Package - Direct Rationale (PPA-DR)*.

##### 7.4.1.2 Package type

This package is an *assurance package*.

##### 7.4.1.3 Package overview

PPA\_DR provides assurance by evaluation of a Direct Rationale Protection Profile, using the criteria specified in ISO/IEC 15408-3.

##### 7.4.1.4 Objectives

PPA-DR is applicable when a Direct Rationale PP is evaluated. It may be used to verify that a Direct Rationale PP conforms with the requirements of ISO/IEC 15408-1.

##### 7.4.1.5 Security assurance components

The security assurance components given in Table 15 are included in the package.

**Table 15 — PPA-DR**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
APE: Protection Profile Evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
	APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements

## 7.4.2 Protection Profile Assurance Package - Standard (PPA-STD)

### 7.4.2.1 Package name

The name of the package is *Protection Profile Assurance Package – Standard (PPA-STD)*.

### 7.4.2.2 Package type

This package is an *assurance package*.

### 7.4.2.3 Package overview

PPA\_STD provides assurance by evaluation of a standard Protection Profile, using the criteria specified in ISO/IEC 15408-3.

### 7.4.2.4 Objectives

PPA-STD is applicable when a Standard PP is evaluated. It may be used to verify that a Standard PP conforms with the requirements of ISO/IEC 15408-1.

### 7.4.2.5 Security assurance components

PPA\_STD provides assurance by evaluation of a standard Protection Profile, as specified in ISO/IEC 15408-1. The assurance components included in PPA\_STD are given in Table 16 — PPA-STD.

**Table 16 — PPA-STD**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
APE: Protection Profile Evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP Introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	APE_ECD.1 Extended component definition
	APE_REQ.2 Security requirements

## 8 Security Target Assurances (STA)

### 8.1 Family Name

The name of this family of packages is *Security Target Assurances (STA)*.

## 8.2 STA family overview

The Security Target Assurance (STA) family provides two assurance packages for ST evaluation.

- a) Assurance package for evaluating direct rationale STs
- b) Assurance package for evaluating standard STs

These assurance packages provide the components that are used in the evaluation of each type of ST described in ISO/IEC 15408-1.

Table 17 represents a summary of the STA packages. The columns represent the set of STAs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

These STAs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Clause 9 of ISO/IEC 15408-3:20XX. More precisely, each STA includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

**Table 17 — STA summary**

Assurance class	Assurance family	Assurance Components by ST Assurance Package	
		STA-DR	STA-STD
ST Evaluation	ASE_INT	1	1
	ASE_CCL	1	1
	ASE_SPD	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2
	ASE_ECD	1	1
	ASE_REQ	1	2
	ASE_TSS	1	1

## 8.3 STA family objectives

The STA objectives are to support the provision of assurance through evaluation that a protection profile conforms with the requirements given in ISO/IEC 15408-1.

## 8.4 STA Packages

### 8.4.1 Security Target Assurance Package – Direct Rationale (STA-DR)

#### 8.4.1.1 Package name

The name of the package is *Security Target Assurance Package - Direct Rationale (STA-DR)*.

#### 8.4.1.2 Package type

This package is an *assurance package*.

### 8.4.1.3 Package overview

STA\_DR provides assurance by evaluation of a Direct Rationale ST, using the criteria specified in ISO/IEC 15408-3.

### 8.4.1.4 Objectives

STA-DR is applicable when a Direct Rationale ST is evaluated. It may be used to verify that a Direct Rationale ST conforms with the requirements of ISO/IEC 15408-1

### 8.4.1.5 Security assurance components

The security assurance components given in Table 18 are included in the package.

**Table 18 — STA-DR**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ASE: ST Evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
	ASE-TSS.1 TOE Summary specification

## 8.4.2 Security Target Assurance Package - Standard (STA-STD)

### 8.4.2.1 Package name

The name of the package is *Security Target Assurance Package – Standard (STA-STD)*.

### 8.4.2.2 Package type

This package is an *assurance package*.

### 8.4.2.3 Package overview

STA\_STD provides assurance by evaluation of a standard ST, using the criteria specified in ISO/IEC 15408-3.

### 8.4.2.4 Objectives

STA-STD is applicable when a Standard ST is evaluated. It may be used to verify that a Standard ST conforms with the requirements of ISO/IEC 15408-1.

### 8.4.2.5 Security assurance components

STA\_STD provides assurance by evaluation of a standard ST, as specified in ISO/IEC 15408-1. The security assurance components given in Table 19 are included in the package.

**Table 19 — STA-STD**

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ASE: ST Evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction

	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.2 Stated security requirements
	ASE-TSS.1 TOE Summary specification



**Form 8A: Committee decision for DIS**

Secretariat:	ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27
DIN	N 20037
Project number and title: ISO/IEC CD 15408-5 - Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements	

This form should be sent to the ISO Central Secretariat (<http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/si/>), together with the draft of the project, by the secretariat of the technical committee or subcommittee concerned.

<b>The accompanying document is submitted for circulation to member body vote:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> As a DIS
<b>Consensus has been obtained from the P-members of the committee:</b> on 2019-10-18 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> At the meeting of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27. See Resolution number 16. In document N 20053. <input type="checkbox"/> By ballot initiated on Please attach a copy of the ballot results (if applicable)

<b>Listing of the P-members (NWIP, CD or Resolution)</b>	
P-members in favour:	16
Belgium (NBN), China (SAC), France (AFNOR), Iran, Islamic Republic of (ISIRI), Ireland (NSAI), Japan (JISC), Korea, Republic of (KATS), Lebanon (LIBNOR), Mexico (DGN), Panama (COPANIT), Peru (INACAL), Romania (ASRO), South Africa (SABS), Sri Lanka (SLSI), Switzerland (SNV), United Kingdom (BSI)	
P-members voting against:	2
Germany (DIN), United States (ANSI)	

<p>P-members abstaining: 29</p> <p>Algeria (IANOR), Argentina (IRAM), Australia (SA), Austria (ASI), Brazil (ABNT), Canada (SCC), Costa Rica (INTECO), Cyprus (CYS), Denmark (DS), Finland (SFS), India (BIS), Indonesia (BSN), Israel (SII), Italy (UNI), Luxembourg (ILNAS), Malaysia (DSM), Mauritius (MSB), Netherlands (NEN), New Zealand (NZSO), Norway (SN), Poland (PKN), Russian Federation (GOST R), Singapore (SSC), Slovakia (UNMS SR), Spain (UNE), Sweden (SIS), Ukraine (DSTU), United Arab Emirates (ESMA), Uruguay (UNIT)</p>
<p>P-members who did not vote: 1</p> <p>Saint Kitts and Nevis (SKNBS)</p>
<p>Remarks:</p> <p>As per Paris CRM Recommendation 16 of the Comment Resolution Meeting (contained in SC 27 N20053) the text for a 1st DIS of ISO/IEC 15408-5 as presented in SC 27 N20037 was submitted to the ISO Central Secretariat ITTF) for the 1st DIS ballot processing on 2020-03-17.</p>

I hereby confirm that this draft meets the requirements of <a href="#">Part 2</a> of the ISO/IEC Directives:		
<p><b>Secretariat:</b></p> <p>DIN</p>	<p><b>Date:</b></p> <p>2020-03-17</p>	<p><b>Name/Signature of TC/SC Secretary:</b></p> <p>Passia, Krystyna Mrs</p>

## Result of voting

### Ballot Information

<b>Ballot reference</b>	ISO/IEC CD 15408-5.3 - ISO-IECJTC1-SC27_N19509
<b>Ballot type</b>	CD
<b>Ballot title</b>	Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT security -- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
<b>Opening date</b>	2019-07-12
<b>Closing date</b>	2019-09-06
<b>Note</b>	3rd CD Consideration  In accordance with Recommendation 14 (see SC 27 N19523) of the 58th SC 27/WG 3 meeting / CRM held in Tel Aviv, Israel, 2019-04-01/05 the hereby attached document is circulated for a 8-week 3rd CD letter ballot closing by 2019-09-06.

### Member responses:

<b>Votes cast (48)</b>	Algeria (IANOR) Argentina (IRAM) Australia (SA) Austria (ASI) Belgium (NBN) Brazil (ABNT) Canada (SCC) China (SAC) Costa Rica (INTECO) Côte d'Ivoire (CODINORM) Cyprus (CYS) Denmark (DS) Finland (SFS) France (AFNOR) Germany (DIN) India (BIS) Indonesia (BSN) Iran, Islamic Republic of (ISIRI) Ireland (NSAI) Israel (SII) Italy (UNI) Japan (JISC) Korea, Republic of (KATS) Lebanon (LIBNOR) Luxembourg (ILNAS) Malaysia (DSM)
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Mauritius (MSB)  
 Mexico (DGN)  
 Netherlands (NEN)  
 New Zealand (NZSO)  
 Norway (SN)  
 Panama (COPANIT)  
 Peru (INACAL)  
 Poland (PKN)  
 Romania (ASRO)  
 Russian Federation (GOST R)  
 Singapore (SSC)  
 Slovakia (UNMS SR)  
 South Africa (SABS)  
 Spain (UNE)  
 Sri Lanka (SLSI)  
 Sweden (SIS)  
 Switzerland (SNV)  
 Ukraine (DSTU)  
 United Arab Emirates (ESMA)  
 United Kingdom (BSI)  
 United States (ANSI)  
 Uruguay (UNIT)

**Comments submitted (0)**

**Votes not cast (1)**

**Saint Kitts and Nevis (SKNBS)**

#### Questions:

**Q.1** "Do you approve the circulation of the draft as a DIS?"

Votes by members	Q.1
<b>Algeria (IANOR)</b>	Abstention
<b>Argentina (IRAM)</b>	Abstention
<b>Australia (SA)</b>	Abstention
<b>Austria (ASI)</b>	Abstention
<b>Belgium (NBN)</b>	Approval
<b>Brazil (ABNT)</b>	Abstention
<b>Canada (SCC)</b>	Abstention
<b>China (SAC)</b>	Approval
<b>Costa Rica (INTECO)</b>	Abstention
<b>Côte d'Ivoire (CODINORM)</b>	Abstention
<b>Cyprus (CYS)</b>	Abstention
<b>Denmark (DS)</b>	Abstention
<b>Finland (SFS)</b>	Abstention
<b>France (AFNOR)</b>	Approval

<b>Germany (DIN)</b>	Disapproval
<b>India (BIS)</b>	Abstention
<b>Indonesia (BSN)</b>	Abstention
<b>Iran, Islamic Republic of (ISIRI)</b>	Approval
<b>Ireland (NSAI)</b>	Approval
<b>Israel (SII)</b>	Abstention
<b>Italy (UNI)</b>	Abstention
<b>Japan (JISC)</b>	Approval with comments
<b>Korea, Republic of (KATS)</b>	Approval
<b>Lebanon (LIBNOR)</b>	Approval
<b>Luxembourg (ILNAS)</b>	Abstention
<b>Malaysia (DSM)</b>	Abstention
<b>Mauritius (MSB)</b>	Abstention
<b>Mexico (DGN)</b>	Approval
<b>Netherlands (NEN)</b>	Abstention
<b>New Zealand (NZSO)</b>	Abstention
<b>Norway (SN)</b>	Abstention
<b>Panama (COPANIT)</b>	Approval
<b>Peru (INACAL)</b>	Approval
<b>Poland (PKN)</b>	Abstention
<b>Romania (ASRO)</b>	Approval
<b>Russian Federation (GOST R)</b>	Abstention
<b>Singapore (SSC)</b>	Abstention
<b>Slovakia (UNMS SR)</b>	Abstention
<b>South Africa (SABS)</b>	Approval
<b>Spain (UNE)</b>	Abstention
<b>Sri Lanka (SLSI)</b>	Approval
<b>Sweden (SIS)</b>	Abstention
<b>Switzerland (SNV)</b>	Approval
<b>Ukraine (DSTU)</b>	Abstention
<b>United Arab Emirates (ESMA)</b>	Abstention
<b>United Kingdom (BSI)</b>	Approval with comments

<b>United States (ANSI)</b>	Disapproval
<b>Uruguay (UNIT)</b>	Abstention

Answers to Q.1: "Do you approve the circulation of the draft as a DIS?"		
<b>14 x</b>	<b>Approval</b>	<b>Belgium (NBN)</b> <b>China (SAC)</b> <b>France (AFNOR)</b> <b>Iran, Islamic Republic of (ISIRI)</b> <b>Ireland (NSAI)</b> <b>Korea, Republic of (KATS)</b> <b>Lebanon (LIBNOR)</b> <b>Mexico (DGN)</b> <b>Panama (COPANIT)</b> <b>Peru (INACAL)</b> <b>Romania (ASRO)</b> <b>South Africa (SABS)</b> <b>Sri Lanka (SLSI)</b> <b>Switzerland (SNV)</b>
<b>2 x</b>	<b>Approval with comments</b>	<b>Japan (JISC)</b> <b>United Kingdom (BSI)</b>
<b>2 x</b>	<b>Disapproval</b>	<b>Germany (DIN)</b> <b>United States (ANSI)</b>
<b>30 x</b>	<b>Abstention</b>	<b>Algeria (IANOR)</b> <b>Argentina (IRAM)</b> <b>Australia (SA)</b> <b>Austria (ASI)</b> <b>Brazil (ABNT)</b> <b>Canada (SCC)</b> <b>Costa Rica (INTECO)</b> <b>Cyprus (CYS)</b> <b>Côte d'Ivoire (CODINORM)</b> <b>Denmark (DS)</b> <b>Finland (SFS)</b> <b>India (BIS)</b> <b>Indonesia (BSN)</b> <b>Israel (SII)</b> <b>Italy (UNI)</b> <b>Luxembourg (ILNAS)</b> <b>Malaysia (DSM)</b> <b>Mauritius (MSB)</b> <b>Netherlands (NEN)</b> <b>New Zealand (NZSO)</b> <b>Norway (SN)</b> <b>Poland (PKN)</b> <b>Russian Federation (GOST R)</b> <b>Singapore (SSC)</b> <b>Slovakia (UNMS SR)</b> <b>Spain (UNE)</b> <b>Sweden (SIS)</b> <b>Ukraine (DSTU)</b> <b>United Arab Emirates (ESMA)</b> <b>Uruguay (UNIT)</b>

Comments from Voters		
Member:	Comment:	Date:
<b>Germany</b> (DIN)	<b><i>Comment File</i></b>	2019-09-03 15:31:49
<b>Japan</b> (JISC)	<b><i>Comment File</i></b>	2019-09-04 11:34:21
<b>United Kingdom</b> (BSI)	<b><i>Comment File</i></b>	2019-09-06 10:55:48
<b>United States</b> (ANSI)	<b><i>Comment File</i></b>	2019-08-30 14:39:30

Comments from Commenters		
Member:	Comment:	Date: